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Abstract — Veriﬁable secret sharing (VSS) is an impor-
tant technique which has been used as a basic tool in dis-
tributed cryptosystems, secure multi-party computations,
as well as safe guarding some conﬁdential information such
as cryptographic keys. By now, some secure and eﬃcient
non-interactive VSS schemes for sharing secrets in a ﬁ-
nite ﬁeld have been available. In this paper, we investi-
gate veriﬁably sharing of a secret that is an element of a
bilinear group. We present an eﬃcient and information-
theoretical secure VSS scheme for sharing such a secret
which may be a private key for a pairing based cryptosys-
tem. Our performance and security analysis indicates that
the newly proposed scheme is more eﬃcient and practical
while enjoys the same level of security compared with sim-
ilar protocols available. We also demonstrate two typical
applications of our proposed VSS scheme. One is the shar-
ing of a secret key of Boneh and Franklin’s identity-based
encryption scheme, and the other is the sharing or the dis-
tributed generation of a secret key of the leakage resilient
bilinear ElGamal encryption scheme.
Key words — Veriﬁable secret sharing, Threshold, Bi-
linear map, Bilinear group, Information-theoretical secure.
I. Introduction
Secret sharing[1] is a fundamental tool of threshold cryp-
tography and distributed computing[2−4]. A secret sharing
scheme involves a dealer D and a set P of participants. It
allows the dealer D to distribute shares of a secret among par-
ticipants of P in such a way that only some qualiﬁed subsets
of P can reconstruct the secret from their shares. Earlier basic
secret sharing schemes assume both the dealer and the partic-
ipants are honest. However this assumption may not be sound
in some real applications. In practice, a dealer may not trust
some participants, and some of the participants may not trust
the dealer either. To solve this kind of distrust, Veriﬁable
secret sharing (VSS)[5] is introduced. In a VSS scheme, par-
ticipants are able to verify whether the shares distributed to
them by the dealer are valid. VSS schemes for sharing secrets
in a ﬁnite ﬁeld have been well established and widely used.
The ﬁrst non-interactive veriﬁable secret sharing scheme was
presented by Feldman in Ref.[6]. In Ref.[7] Pedersen presented
the ﬁrst non-interactive and information-theoretic secure VSS
scheme. These two VSS schemes for sharing secrets in a ﬁnite
ﬁeld are generally known as Feldman-VSS and Pedersen-VSS
respectively. They have been used as basic building blocks in
distributed key generation and threshold cryptosystems based
on the discrete logarithm problem in ﬁnite ﬁelds. Recently, the
bilinear pairing-based cryptography has received much atten-
tion from the research community and many bilinear pairing-
based cryptographic schemes and protocols[8−17] have been
available. For some of these bilinear pairing-based crypto-
graphic schemes, the secret keys may come from a bilinear
group rather than a ﬁnite ﬁeld. To share such secret keys,
we have to consider veriﬁably sharing an element of a bilinear
group. A notable work in this line was presented by J. Baek
and Y. Zheng. In Ref.[9], they showed two secure veriﬁable
secret sharing schemes for sharing secrets in bilinear groups
as building blocks of their expected ID-based threshold signa-
ture scheme. As the algebraic properties of groups are very
diﬀerent from that of ﬁnite ﬁelds, we think it is not trivial
to generalize the veriﬁable secret sharing schemes over ﬁnite
ﬁeld to secure veriﬁable secret sharing schemes over bilinear
groups. In this paper, we focus on establishing eﬃcient and
information-theoretic secure veriﬁable secret sharing schemes
over bilinear groups. We demonstrate such a new VSS scheme.
The newly proposed scheme is more eﬃcient compared with
J. Baek and Y. Zheng’s Unconditionally secure veriﬁable se-
cret sharing scheme based on the bilinear pairing (UVSSBP)[9].
Therefore, it is quite reasonable to believe that our scheme will
have practical applications in threshold cryptosystem such as
threshold decryption and threshold signature based on bilinear
groups.
II. Preliminaries and Deﬁnitions
In this section, we brieﬂy describe the concept of bilinear
pairings and the notion of veriﬁable secret sharing.
1. Bilinear pairings
Let G1 and G2 be two groups with the same order q, where
q is a large prime. Here, we denote the operation in G1 addi-
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tion, while the operation in G2 is denoted multiplication. A
map eˆ: G1 × G1 → G2 is called a bilinear map (or a bilinear
pairing) if it satisﬁes the following three conditions:
(1) Bilinear: For all P,Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z∗q , eˆ(aP, bQ) =
eˆ(P,Q)ab.
(2) Non-degenerate: There exist P,Q ∈ G1 such that
eˆ(P,Q) = 1.
(3) Computable: For all P,Q ∈ G1, there exists an eﬃcient
algorithm to compute eˆ(P,Q).
We say that a cyclic group G1 with prime order q is a bi-
linear group if there exists a group G2 with the same order q
and a bilinear map eˆ: G1 ×G1 → G2. For more details about
bilinear pairing and bilinear groups, please refer to Refs.[9–17].
2. Modified generalized bilinear inversion problem
in (G1,G2, eˆ)
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups with the same prime
order q, and eˆ: G1×G1 → G2 a bilinear pairing. The modiﬁed
generalized bilinear inversion problem in (G1, G2, eˆ) is: Given
a random γ ∈ G2 and a generator P of G1, compute W ∈ G1
such that eˆ(W,P ) = γ.
3. Verifiable secret sharing
At ﬁrst, we review some basic notions about veriﬁable se-
cret sharing including the communication model, the basic
components and the security requirements for an information-
theoretic secure VSS scheme.
(1) Communication model
The communication model of a veriﬁable secret sharing
scheme is composed of a set of n players U1, U2, · · · , Un and
a dealer D that can be modeled by polynomial-time random-
ized Turing machines. We suppose they are connected by a
complete network of private point-to-point channels. In addi-
tion, all the players and the dealer have access to a dedicated
broadcast channel[7].
(2) Components of a VSS scheme
A VSS scheme is divided into four phases: initialization,
distribution, veriﬁcation, and reconstruction.
(a) Initialization This phase produces necessary pa-
rameters of the scheme.
(b) Distribution The dealer publishes commitments
and distributes shares of the secret to all participants.
(c) Verification This phase is executed by the partici-
pants to verify whether the shares they received are valid.
(d) Reconstruction The participants who intend to re-
cover the secret execute the reconstruction phase together. Ac-
tually they need submit their shares and verify the validity of
shares supplied by the other participants before reconstruc-
tion.
(3) Notions of security
Here we consider a static and strong admissible
adversary[7,18]. That means the adversary has determined
which participants to corrupt at the start of the protocol, and
can corrupt less than participants totally. An information-
theoretic secure VSS scheme should satisfy the following re-
quirements.
(a) Consistency of the shares The dealer can not pass
through veriﬁcation when he distributes inconsistent shares.
(b) Privacy of the secret No information about the
secret is revealed to the adversary. This means that:   The
public information does not reveal any information about the
secret.  A static and strong admissible adversary can get
no information about the share of any uncorrupted player and
the shared secret.
III. Review of Some Information-
theoretic Secure VSS Schemes
In this section we review the non-interactive and
information-theoretic secure veriﬁable secret sharing scheme
of Pedersen and UVSSBP scheme of J. Baek and Y. Zheng.
1. Pedersen-VSS
(1) Initialization
Assume that p and q are two large primes such that q di-
vides p−1. Let Gq be the unique subgroup of Z∗p of order q, and
g, h be two generators of Gq such that nobody knows logg h.
The secret space is GF (q) and the share space is GF (q)2. Let
s ∈ GF (q) be the secret to be shared, n the number of players
and t the threshold with the restriction 1 ≤ t ≤ n < q.
(2) Distribution
(a) D publishes a commitment to the secret s: E0 =
E(s, r) = gshr for a randomly chosen r ∈ Z∗q .
(b) D chooses a1, · · · , at−1 at random from Zq and con-
structs a polynomial f(x) = s+ a1x+ · · ·+ at−1xt−1 of degree
t− 1. Compute si = f(i).
(c) D chooses b1, · · · , bt−1 ∈ Zq at random and publishes
commitments to ai for i = 1, · · · , t−1: Ei = E(ai, bi) = gaihbi .
(d) Let g(x) = r + b1x + · · ·+ bt−1xt−1 and set ri = g(i).
D sends (si, ri) secretly to Ui for i = 1, · · · , n.
(3) Algorithm of verification
When Ui has received his share (si, ri) he veriﬁes if
E(si, ri) =
t−1∏
j=0
Ei
j
j (1)
If the veriﬁcation fails, the share (si, ri) assigned to Ui is in-
valid.
(4) Algorithm of reconstruction
Without loss of generality, we suppose U1, · · · , Ut be the t
players to reconstruct the shared secret. Each Ui broadcasts
his share (si, ri) to other cooperators, and every participator
can check its validity through Eq.(1). For i = 1, · · · , t, while
all (si, ri) have been veriﬁed to be valid, every cooperator can
reconstruct s by computing
s =
t∑
i=1
si
∏
1≤j≤t,j =i
i
i− j (2)
2. UVSSBP scheme of J. Baek and Y. Zheng
(1) Initialization
Suppose G1 and G2 are two groups with the same order
q and eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 is a bilinear map. Assume P is a
generator of G1 and H , I are two random elements of G1 given
to D and no party knows a, b ∈ Z∗q such that H = aP and
I = bP . The secret space is G∗1 and the share space is G1×Zq.
Let S ∈ G1 be the secret to be shared. The number of players
is n and the threshold is t with the restriction 1 ≤ t ≤ n < q.
(2) Distribution
(a) D chooses a random r from Z∗q and publishes a com-
mitment to S: E0 = E(S, r) = eˆ(S, P )eˆ(H, I)
r.
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(b) D randomly chooses A1, · · · , At−1 from G∗1. Construct
F (x) = S + A1x + · · ·+ At−1xt−1 and compute Si = F (i) for
i = 1, · · · , n.
(c) D chooses a1, · · · , at−1 randomly from Z∗q and con-
structs a polynomial f(x) = r + a1x + · · · + at−1xt−1. Then
compute ri = f(i) for i = 1, · · · , n.
(d) For i = 1, · · · , t − 1, D broadcasts Ei = E(Ai, ai) =
eˆ(Ai, P )eˆ(H, I)
ai and sends (Si, ri) secretly to Ui for i =
1, · · · , t− 1.
(3) Verification
When Ui has received his share (Si, ri) he veriﬁes if
E(Si, ri) =
t−1∏
j=0
Ei
j
j (3)
If the veriﬁcation fails, the share Si assigned to Ui is invalid.
(4) Algorithm of reconstruction
Without loss of generality, let U1, · · · , Ut be the t players
to reconstruct the shared secret. Each Ui broadcasts his share
(Si, ri) to other cooperators, and every participator can check
its validity through Eq.(3). For i = 1, · · · , t, while all (Si, ri)
have been veriﬁed to be valid, every cooperator can reconstruct
S by computing
S =
t∑
i=1
Si
∏
1≤j≤t,j =i
i
i− j (4)
IV. Our Scheme
In this section, we present our eﬃcient and information-
theoretical secure veriﬁable secret sharing scheme from bilinear
groups. Then we analyze the security of the newly proposed
scheme. We prove that our new scheme satisﬁes the security
requirements for information-theoretic secure veriﬁable secret
sharing schemes. At last we discuss the eﬃciency of perfor-
mance of our new scheme. We compare the computational cost
of our scheme with that of J. Baek and Y. Zheng’s UVSSBP
scheme.
1. Description of the scheme
(1) Initialization
Let (G1,+) and (G2, ·) be cyclic groups with the same large
prime order q, P a generator of G1 and eˆ : G1 × G1 → G2 a
bilinear map. It is required that the discrete logarithm prob-
lem is intractable in both G1 and G2. Let α = eˆ(P, P ) be
a generator of G2. Denote by n the number of participants,
and t is the threshold. These parameters can be generated
cooperatively by the dealer D and all participants. To gener-
ate a random β ∈ G2 such that no party knows the discrete
logarithm of β with respect to the base α, the dealer and the
players cooperate as follows:
(a) For i = 1, · · · , n each Ui chooses uniformly at random
a βi ∈ G2 and sends it to D.
(b) On receiving all βi for i = 1, · · · , n, D sets β = ∏ni=1 βi.
(c) D publishes (n, t, q,G1, G2, eˆ, P, α, β, β1, β2, · · · , βn) as
public parameters. The secret space is G1, and the share space
is G1 × Zq .
(2) Distribution
(a) To generate a secret S to be shared. D picks an s ∈ Z∗q
and sets S = sP .
(b) D chooses a1, · · · , at−1, b0, · · · , bt−1 from Z∗q uniformly
at random and deﬁnes f(x) = a0 + a1x + · · · + at−1xt−1,
g(x) = b0 + b1x + · · ·+ bt−1xt−1 where a0 = s.
(c) D computes and publishes Ei = E(ai, bi) = α
aiβbi for
i = 0, · · · , t− 1 as the commitments of S and f(x).
(d) D computes Si = f(i)P , ri = g(i) and sends (Si, ri)
secretly to Ui for i = 1, · · · , n.
(3) Verification
When Ui has received his share (Si, ri) he veriﬁes if
eˆ(Si, P )β
ri =
t−1∏
j=0
Ei
j
j (5)
If the veriﬁcation fails, the share (Si, ri) assigned to Ui is in-
valid.
(4) Reconstruction
Without loss of generality, suppose U1, · · · , Ut are the t
participants to reconstruct the shared secret.
(a) Each Ui broadcasts his share Si to other cooperators,
and every participator can check its validity through Eq.(5).
(b) For i = 1, · · · , t, while all Si have been veriﬁed to be
valid, every cooperator can reconstruct S by computing
S =
t∑
i=1
Si
∏
1≤j≤t,j =i
i
i− j (6)
2. Security
We analyze the security of our scheme according to the
security notions given in Section II.
(1) Consistency of the shares
The following theorem shows that the dealer cannot pass
through veriﬁcation if he distributes inconsistent shares under
the assumption that he cannot ﬁnd logα β expect with negli-
gible probability in q.
Theorem 1 Under the assumption that Modiﬁed gener-
alized bilinear inversion problem in (G1, G2, eˆ) is intractable
and the discrete logarithm of β with respect to base α is un-
known, the dealer can not compute an inconsistent share that
passes the veriﬁcation successfully with a non-negligible prob-
ability.
Proof Assume that D gives an invalid share (S′i, r
′
i) to
participant Ui and (S
′
i, r
′
i) satisﬁes the veriﬁcation equation.
Then we have
eˆ(S′i, P )β
r′i = αf(i)βg(i) (7)
and hence
eˆ(S′i, P ) = α
f(i)βg(i)−r
′
i (8)
where f(x) and g(x) are the polynomials used by D in the dis-
tribution phase, and s′i = f(i), r′i = g(i). Set αf(i)βg(i)−r
′
i = γ
where γ is the input of the Modiﬁed generalized bilinear in-
version problem in (G1, G2, eˆ), then D can output W = S
′
i.
This implies that D can successfully ﬁnd a solution for an in-
stance of the Modiﬁed generalized bilinear inversion problem
in (G1, G2, eˆ).
On the other hand, with S′i = s
′
iP and eˆ(P, P ) = α we get
αs
′
iβr
′
i = αf(i)βg(i) (9)
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from Eq.(7). Then we have
αs
′
i−f(i) = βg(i)−r
′
i (10)
As s′i = f(i), r′i = g(i), D can calculate
logα β =
s′i − f(i)
g(i)− r′i
(11)
That means D knows the discrete logarithm of β with respect
to base α.
(2) Privacy of the secret
To prove that no information about the secret is revealed
to the adversary, we give the following two theorems. The
ﬁrst theorem is very easy to prove and shows that the public
commitments do not reveal any usable information about the
secret, and the second one implies the privacy of the secret in
case there exists a static and strong admissible adversary who
corrupts up to k < t players.
Theorem 2 For any s ∈ Z∗q and for randomly uniformly
chosen r ∈ Zq, E(s, r) is uniformly distributed in G2.
Proof As r is an element randomly chosen from Zq, it
is apparent that βr is uniformly distributed in G2 since β is
a generator of G2. And consequently E(s, r) = α
sβr is uni-
formly distributed in G2.
This theorem shows that E(s, b0) does not reveal any infor-
mation about s and consequently the secret S = sP . Similarly
for i = 1, · · · , t− 1 each E(ai, bi) does not reveal any informa-
tion about ai. So the public commitments do not reveal any
information about the polynomial f(x).
Theorem 3 With the shares of those corrupted partici-
pants, a static and strong admissible adversary can not derive
any information about the share kept by any honest partici-
pant and consequently no information about the secret S.
Proof From Theorem 2, we learn that the adversary can
not get any information about the secret polynomial f(x) given
the public commitments. Nevertheless according to the algo-
rithm of distribution, to acquire the share owned by an honest
participant, the adversary has no choice but compute f(x)
merely using the shares of the corrupted participants. With-
out loss of generality we suppose that the corrupted players
are U1, · · · , Uk and k < t. The adversary has to compute all
coeﬃcients a1, · · · , at−1 of f(x) from the following system of
equations:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
a0P + a1P + · · ·+ at−1P = S1
a0P + a12P + · · ·+ at−12t−1P = S2
...
a0P + a1kP + · · ·+ at−1kt−1P = Sk
(12)
i.e. ⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
P P · · · P
P 2P · · · 2t−1P
...
...
. . .
...
P kP · · · kt−1P
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
a0
a1
...
at−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
S1
S2
...
Sk
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ (13)
Let Si = ciP , the above system of equations is equivalent to
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 1 · · · 1
1 2 · · · 2t−1
...
...
. . .
...
1 k · · · kt−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
a0
a1
...
at−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦P =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
c1
c2
...
ck
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦P (14)
i.e. ⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 1 · · · 1
1 2 · · · 2t−1
...
...
...
1 k · · · kt−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
a0
a1
...
at−1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
c1
c2
...
ck
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ (15)
This is a system of linear equations where the rank of the
coeﬃcient matrix is less than the number of variables. That
means it has not less than qt−k solutions and the probability
for the adversary to dope out the genuine (a0, · · · , at−1) is not
more than 1/qt−k. Accordingly the probability for the adver-
sary to calculate the correct share of any uncorrupted player
is not more than 1/qt−k. As q is a large primer and t− k ≥ 1,
this probability is negligible. Hence, the adversary who cor-
rupts up to t − 1 participants gets no information about the
shared secret.
The three theorems above show that in our scheme the con-
sistency of the shares depends on a computational assumption
while the privacy of the secret is unconditional. This means
our scheme is information-theoretical secure.
3. Computational cost
To compare the computational cost of the newly proposed
scheme with that of J. Baek and Y. Zheng’s scheme, we count
the number of those time-consuming operations in diﬀerent
phases of both schemes and list them in Table 1. We use P,
S and E to denote the operation of a bilinear pairing, a scalar
multiplication in G1 and an exponentiation in G2 respectively.
As in J. Baek and Y. Zheng’s UVSSBP the initialization
algorithm does not give deﬁnite procedures of generating the
parameters, we just consider the distribution phase, veriﬁca-
tion phase and reconstruction phase in this table. And in the
reconstruction phase we assume there are t participants and
the cost of veriﬁcation is not included as it is the same in the
two schemes.
Table 1. Comparison of computational cost
UVSSBP Our new scheme
Distribution phase tP + (t− 1)nS+ tE (n + 1)S + 2tE
Veriﬁcation phase tP+ n(t + 1)E tP+ n(t + 1)E
Reconstruction phase tS tS
The comparison reveals that in our scheme, the operations
of computing bilinear pairing and scalar multiplication in G1
are greatly reduced, although exponentiation in G2 increases.
As computing bilinear pairings is the most time-consuming op-
eration, it is quite reasonable to say that our newly proposed
scheme has a lower computational cost than J. Baek and Y.
Zheng’s UVSSBP. As the communication cost is the same in
the two schemes, our scheme is more eﬃcient under the same
level of security.
V. Applications
Our information theoretic secret sharing scheme over bilin-
ear groups has wide applications especially in the case where
the secret S to be shared is in a bilinear group G1 and the
discrete logarithm of S to a given generator P of G1 is known
to the dealer. Here, we give two typical examples.
The ﬁrst one is to share a secret key of the identity-based
cryptosystem of Boneh and Franklin[12] employing the Private
Eﬃcient and Information-Theoretical Secure Veriﬁable Secret Sharing over Bilinear Groups 17
key generation center (PKG) as a dealer. This is a preferable
choice for sharing the secret key of an identity for threshold
realization of decryption or signature in Boneh and Franklin’s
identity-based setting. For an identity ID, the secret key for
ID can be computed by the PKG as dID = sH(ID), where s
is the master secret key only known to the PKG. When asked
to share the secret key of identity ID in a set of n designated
participants with threshold t, the PKG can play the role of
the dealer and shares dID using our sharing scheme. Hav-
ing shared the secret key dID = sH(ID) of identity ID, t
or more than t participants can cooperate to decrypt cipher-
texts or sign messages on behalf of identity ID using threshold
decryption or signature techniques.
The second is the sharing or distributed generation of a
user’s secret key in the bilinear ElGamal encryption scheme[11]
which has been proved leakage resilient. This is necessary for
safe guarding the secret key or for the purpose of threshold de-
cryption. In the bilinear ElGamal encryption scheme, a user
picks uniformly at random an x ∈ Z∗q , and sets its secret key
as SK = xP , public key as PK = eˆ(P, P )x. So, our shar-
ing scheme can directly be used to sharing such a secret key.
To distributed generate such a secret key, the n participants
P1, P2, · · · , Pn can execute in a parallel manner our sharing
scheme n times with the same threshold t. Each Pi acts as a
dealer once and shares its random choice of xiP . At last, the
generated secret key is the sum of all those correctly shared
xiP , and has been shared by the n participants with thresh-
old t. An attacker corrupts up to t− 1 participants can get no
information about the shared secret key, while the public key
can be computed by each participant.
VI. Conclusions
We concentrate on veriﬁably sharing a secret from a bi-
linear group. An eﬃcient and information-theoretic secure
scheme for sharing such a secret has been presented. The
new scheme is more eﬃcient compared with J. Baek and Y.
Zheng’s UVSSBP scheme while enjoys the same level of secu-
rity. Similar to Feldman VSS, Pedersen VSS, and the UVSSBP
scheme of J. Baek and Y. Zheng, our scheme is also homomor-
phic. This property makes it easy to convert our scheme into a
proactive veriﬁable secret sharing scheme and also makes our
scheme applicable to a number of real application environ-
ments. Thus it is quite reasonable to believe that our scheme
will have wide applications in multi-party computation in bi-
linear groups, distributed key generation and threshold cryp-
tosystems based on bilinear groups.
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